We model of demand-led growth with endogenous adjustment of labor supply and productivity to accommodate the demand-led path, reconciling Harrod's warranted rate of demand growth with supply. The model delivers a range of growth paths and unemployment rates rather than a single "natural rate." Theoretically, the steady-state growth path may be dynamically stable or unstable, but a detailed empirical calibration favors stability. We show analytically that if demand dynamics are stable, supply will converge to demand. While a minimum unemployment rate ultimately imposes a supply constraint on growth, empirical results show that a wide range of steady-state growth rates are feasible across different demand regimes. The results explain how economies can become trapped with low growth due to weak demand or fiscal austerity and suggest policy responses to stagnant demand.
Introduction
The question of what determines medium-term macroeconomic growth looms large in developed countries. A decade after the financial crisis burst the US housing bubble growth has not been anywhere near sufficient to recover the pre-crisis trend. In Europe, growth has fallen short of expectations (or expectations are continually revised downward) with fiscal austerity as a likely culprit in many countries. Growth in the Japanese economy has underperformed for more than two decades.
In a market economy, profit-seeking firms hire workers and produce because they expect to sell output, an expectation grounded in actual demand. Of course, demand growth is not sufficient to generate expansion. Growth also requires the resources and technology to produce more output. In a very general sense, therefore, growth depends on the dynamics of both demand and supply.
Mainstream growth models, going back at least to Solow (1956) , treat the demand and supply sides asymmetrically. Demand is assumed to accommodate to supply automatically beyond possible short-run fluctuations. Growth models based on the neoclassical synthesis perspective assume (often implicitly) that market adjustments of nominal wages and prices close any gap between aggregate demand and a supply-determined output path. More recently, in so-called "New Keynesian" models, wise monetary policy reconciles demand and supply which again implies that growth beyond the short run is driven by the supply side only, with the dynamics of aggregate demand pushed entirely offstage. 1 We challenge the view that economic growth beyond the short run can be explained by the supply side alone. The idea that nominal adjustment eliminates demand constraints has always been a 1 In mainstream models of endogenous growth, the demand side can affect growth rate by changing conditions of supply. For example, a change in saving behavior can affect capital accumulation. But in these models, the proximate determinant of long-run output and growth is still supply. weak link in mainstream macroeconomics. 2 The general ability of monetary policy to close demand gaps has also been questioned, especially in the stagnant aftermath of the Great Recession (Summers, 2014, for example) . We propose a model in which demand constrains output over a medium-run to long-run horizon. This approach is consistent with heterodox research on demand-led growth models.
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That said, these models often leave the supply side implicit or assume an infinitely elastic supply of labor (see Dutt, 2012 and Serrano, 2015 for examples) . This approach may have empirical relevance for emerging-market economies that can draw large numbers of workers from subsistence agriculture into market production. But developed economies have operated for much of the time in recent decades not so far away from conventional estimates of full employment. In this situation, it is unreasonable to assume that arbitrary increases in demand growth can be accommodated without limit by the supply side. Setterfield (2013, page 24) , following Cornwall (1972) , describes this context as a "mature economy in which conditions of full employment may, in principle, be approached. " Skott (1989 " Skott ( , 2010 considers the importance of labor supply constraints even when demand dynamics determine growth.
We begin with a model of aggregate demand dynamics following Harrod (1939) . As in Fazzari, et al. (2013) , however, the inherent instability of the Harrod model is contained from above by the supply of resources and from below by autonomous demand, that is, demand that is not induced by income or output. If autonomous demand grows at a constant rate, this growth rate determines the steady-state growth rate of demand, a result that Serrano (1995) labeled the "supermultiplier" model (also see Cesaratto, et al., 2003; Allain, 2015; Freitas and Serrano, 2015; and Serrano and Freitas, 2 The conventional view that Keynesian results depend on nominal rigidity is ironic considering Keynes's own arguments in chapter 19 of the General Theory. See Palley (2008) for a recent contribution and additional citations. Bhaduri (2006, p. 70) makes similar arguments in the specific context of growth theory. 2017). We confirm and extend these demand-side results here and interpret their relevance for understanding actual economic growth.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce dynamics of supply that link both labor supply growth and labor productivity endogenously to the state of the economy determined by demand just the opposite of the mainstream perspective about economic growth. We show that demand leads supply in the sense that supply growth will converge to the demand-led growth path, just the opposite of the mainstream perspective about growth. Therefore, there is no single "natural" rate of supply growth. Instead, different levels of autonomous demand growth can generate a continuum of dynamic paths for actual output and the unemployment rate. This result proposes a solution to Harrod's "reconciliation problem" between the growth of supply and demand.
While growth is demand led, supply constraints limit the maximum feasible rate of growth. If the unemployment rate is bounded below (even at zero) the range of demand growth rates that supply can accommodate is bounded above. Therefore, demand cannot generate arbitrarily high rates of growth. That said, calibration of the model, based on original empirical estimates of the linkages between demand and supply conditions, shows the range of feasible demand growth rates that can be accommodated by supply potentially covers a wide range of empirically relevant growth rates. We use this result to interpret how, for example, the loss of autonomous demand associated with the end of unsustainable household financial dynamics or with misguided fiscal austerity can trap an economy on a low-growth path of both demand and supply, well below what is feasible. This approach links our model to the interpretation of "secular stagnation" (see Summers 2014 and Fazzari, 2015) in the U.S. and other developed economies.
Section 2 of this paper presents the demand side of the growth model and basic steady-state results. The endogenous dynamics of supply are discussed in section 3 and section 4 shows how the demand and supply sides are reconciled. In section 5 we present an empirical calibration of the model.
These results show that although the model can generate both stable and unstable cyclical growth paths, convergence toward the growth path determined by autonomous demand is the most likely empirical outcome. In addition, analytical results demonstrate that if demand dynamics are stable, supply will converge to demand as long as steady-state demand growth does not require an unemployment rate below the minimum feasible level. Section 6 discusses the implications of our model for understanding how the practical dynamics of demand lead economic growth. In particular, our empirical analysis shows how changes in autonomous demand growth that induce just modest changes in the unemployment rate can cause supply to accommodate acceleration of demand from stagnant levels to growth rates associated with booming economies. Section 7 concludes and suggests where the results presented here can lead further research.
Aggregate Demand and Steady-State Growth
Aggregate demand in our model consists of three components: business investment that accumulates the productive capital stock, consumption spending induced by income, and an autonomous component. Autonomous demand is defined as spending with dynamics independent of the state of the economy that does not build productive capacity. It could consist of autonomous consumption spending (as in Freitas and Serrano, 2016) , government spending (Allain, 2015, for example), or exports (Nah and Lavoie, 2017 , for example).
We assume that firms choose investment in period t to reach a target expected capital-output ratio in t+1. Firms control the capital stock in t+1, but they do not know period t+1 output when they choose period t investment. Therefore, investment is based on information at the beginning of period t including expectations about period t+1 output ( +1 ). We denote the target capital-output ratio as
We treat ̂ as a behavioral choice by firms rather than as an endogenous outcome that depends on the state of the economy, as is the case in many demand-led growth models. 4 This point is explained by Skott (1989, p. 53) : "investment is primarily induced rather than autonomous, and in steady growth the utilisation ratio of capital must be at the desired level" and by Cesaratto et al. (2003, p. 41) : "capacity-creating expenditures basically depend on expectations about the evolution of effective demand over the life of the equipment." But despite their intention to invest to reach ̂, firms may not exactly hit the target because of uncertainty and time lags between the investment decision and the time that the capital becomes productive. For these reasons, as in Allain (2015 equation 6) and Freitas and Serrano (2016, equation 3), we assume that the target capital-output ratio (or the target rate of capacity utilization) adjusts partially in each period toward a long-run value (v*) chosen by firms: Fazzari et al. (2013) we assumed ̂= * , that is = 1. Serrano and Freitas (2017) present a strong case that immediate adjustment of the capital stock to the long-run target level may induce unrealistic instability and hence they prefer a specification with < 1 along the lines of the traditional "flexible accelerator." Empirical evidence is also consistent with a value of substantially less than one. Indeed, in section 5 we discuss estimates of from U.S. data as low as 0.09.
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The long-run * depends on the technical requirements of production. It also depends on the strategic choices of firms about excess capacity. If firms wish to have less than full capacity utilization in normal times to meet unanticipated demand shocks, * will be higher than the technical capitaloutput ratio. As converges to * capacity utilization will converge to the desired level.
Gross investment in period t is set to reach the capital stock in period t+1 determined by ̂:
where is the geometric depreciation rate of the capital stock and is expected growth in output between periods t-1 and t+1. 6 We also restrict gross investment to be non-negative ( ≥ 0).
As in Fazzari, et al. (2013, also see Ferri and Variato, 2010) we use a simple adaptive rule for expected growth:
Expected growth is a weighted average of past actual growth rates with weights that decline geometrically over time. 7 Furthermore, the form of the adaptive growth expectation rule is somewhat different from the partial adjustment rule for the target capital-output ratio. The dynamics of ̂ are anchored to a long-run parameter (v*) known by firms because it is chosen by firms. There is no similar anchor for growth expectations. As we show below, the model has a steady-state growth rate, but this rate is a property of the model and does not arise directly from the agent behaviors. There is no reason that firms will know the steady-state growth rate of demand or even if a stable steady-state demand path exists in the context of uncertainty about the structure of the economy. If the dynamics of the model are stable, a learning process like the one captured in our behavioral specification for might lead expectations to converge to estimate the level of steady-state growth, but we argue that steady-state growth itself should not appear in the behavioral specification of expectation formation which depends entirely on the actual history of growth rates.
Induced consumption depends on income. Again, to keep the model strictly recursive, we assume that consumption plans during period t are made by projecting t-1 income forward one period:
where is the constant marginal propensity to save out of expected income. Aggregate demand ( ) is the sum of the demand components:
where represents autonomous demand. Substituting the specifications for consumption and investment gives
Suppose, initially, demand is less than supply so that demand constrains the economy in both periods t and t-1. In this case output and income are determined by demand ( = ). Divide equation 1 by −1 to obtain the law of motion for demand-determined output growth:
where = −1 − 1 ⁄ .
To explore possible steady-state properties of the model, solve equation 2 for a time-dependent equilibrium growth rate * such that expectations are realized ( = ). Also set the target capitaloutput ratio equal to its long-run desired level (̂+ 1 = * ). The growth rate * that satisfies these conditions is:
where the autonomous demand ratio is = ⁄ . As discussed in Fazzari et al. (2013) Second, on a related topic, we do not assert that the steady-state growth path is necessarily some kind of "fully adjusted" or "long run" equilibrium to which the system converges. Again, a necessary condition for such convergence is the dynamic stability of the model. Furthermore, long-run convergence would require a long-run constant rate of growth of autonomous demand, which is empirically unlikely. Indeed, there may be different sources of autonomous demand with different growth rates. Hicks (1950) thought of autonomous demand as investment spending. Allain (2015) and Ferri (2016) define autonomous demand as government spending, while Freitas and Serrano (2016) model autonomous demand as consumption. It seems reasonable that autonomous demand would consist of these components, as well as a share of imports and likely most of exports (Thirlwall, 1980; Setterfield, 1997; Lavoie and Nah, 2017) . In the realistic case that different components of autonomous demand grow at different rates, total autonomous demand will never grow at a constant rate in finite time. Medium-run dynamics will reflect different growth rates of different autonomous demand components and the relative size of these components.
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Third, and perhaps most important, even if the system does not converge to steady state, the steady state can function as a "center of gravity" for actual dynamics. In Fazzari et al. (2013) we explain how the path of autonomous demand determines the dynamics of the lower bound of a cyclical path. Furthermore, if autonomous demand grows at rates less than or equal to the growth of supply (as we discuss in the next section) the average growth rate of a cyclical path is determined by the growth rate of autonomous demand even if the system does not converge to steady state.
In addition, it is important to recognize that while the steady-state growth rate is determined entirely by the growth rate of autonomous demand, the level of the steady-state path depends on all parameters of demand. This result is evident from equation 4. For example, a decline in the saving rate, other things equal, does not change the steady-state growth rate of output. But equation 4 shows that a permanently lower value of raises the level of steady-state demand. 11 Therefore, the model implies a steady-state "paradox of thrift" result.
Endogenous Dynamics that Adapt Supply to Demand
The central contribution of this paper is to explore how supply adapts to demand conditions. In particular, we are interested in how changes in demand growth could lead supply expansion so that supply growth accommodates demand expansion. If this is the case, demand can be the proximate constraint on output at any point in time, but demand growth will endogenously create supply to prevent aggregate supply from limiting production.
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As is typical in related research, we assume that output is produced with a linear Leontief technology. 13 The capital-output ratio * determines the output capacity provided by the current capital stock. The capital stock is endogenous in the model, that is, capital is produced. We assume firms target a sufficiently low capacity utilization rate that output is not constrained by an inadequate supply of capital, at least for empirically sensible aggregate fluctuations. As described by Freitas and Serrano (2016) , among others, this behavior arises because production is profitable at the margin for firms and 11 In steady state, a decline in s raises output so that the ratio of autonomous demand to output also declines: * = − * ( * + ), from equation 3. Lavoie (2016) presents a similar result. Nah and Lavoie (2017) also derive this kind of result in a model with autonomous demand growth determined by exports. Also see the discussion in Nikiforos (2018) . 12 The results to follow imply that this outcome is theoretically possible and empirically realistic. But we cannot rule out the possibility that demand growth might be sufficiently high to exceed supply. In the simulation model discussed later in the paper actual output will be set at the level of supply if demand exceeds supply, that is, = min ( , ). In a more fully developed model of possible supply constraints, sectoral bottlenecks could be introduced as well as inflation and monetary policy responses as output approaches supply limits. We leave these developments for further research.
13 Tavani and Zamparelli (2017b) in an insightful survey of models of economic growth identify a Leontief technology as a common feature of heterodox growth models that rejects the marginal productivity theory of income distribution and allows for under-utilized capital and labor. This survey provides a useful overview of many of the linkages between the supply side and the demand side discussed in this section along with extensive references. they wish to have enough capacity to meet unanticipated increases in sales. The assumption also accords well with empirical measures of capacity utilization that stay well below 100 percent. 14 Labor supply may impose a more meaningful constraint on production over the medium run. Labor supply growth is related to the unemployment rate:
The constant 0 captures exogenous demographic factors like the growth of the working age population as well as preferences and social norms, such as female labor force participation. The second term creates a negative effect of the unemployment rate on labor supply growth. One reason is a decline in labor force participation due to the rising difficulty of finding an acceptable job match as unemployment rises. Phillips curve effects of higher unemployment on wages could also discourage labor force participation and reduce working hours (see Delong and Summers, 2012 and The Economist, 2016) . 16 High unemployment also tends to reduce immigration (see Setterfield, 2003 , who follows Cornwall, 1977 . The empirical appendix describes findings of an economically and statistically significant 1 coefficient.
We model the growth rate of the labor productivity as a function of two key variables, the unemployment rate and the replacement rate of the capital stock:
The constant 0 captures exogenous changes in labor productivity. Labor productivity is usually strongly procyclical, a fact emphasized in the "real business cycle" literature and captured in the second term of equation 6. The incentives for labor-saving innovation also rise in a low-unemployment environment (see Storm, 2017, pp. 17-21 and Tavani and Zamparelli, 2017b , section 5 for discussion and further references). R&D expenditure also tends to be procyclical (see Brown et al. 2009 ).
Robinson (1962, page 51) writes "[w]hen firms can see profitable markets expanding around them but cannot get hands, they set about trying to find labour-saving devices." Dutt (2006, p. 325) 
refers to
Robinson and argues that labor productivity growth depends on the change, rather than the level of unemployment. He summarizes the argument with "the old adage that necessity is the mother of invention. … The speed of technological change is essentially determined by pressures and bottlenecks in the economy" (also see Cornwall and Cornwall, 1994) . While this intuition is compelling, it seems to imply that the growth rate of labor productivity depends on the level rather than the change in the unemployment rate, as argued persuasively in Palley (2014) , and consistent with the specification in equation 6. Flaschel and Skott (2006) discuss how labor shortages (low unemployment levels) could raise incentives for labor-saving innovation (as well as greater immigration, consistent with equation 5 above). Bhaduri (2006) links labor productivity to "labor discipline" by positing that labor productivity grows faster when unemployment is lower to keep real wages from rising due to labor shortages. Hein and Tarassow (2010) and Bivens (2017) provide empirical support for this channel and for the broader implication that a stronger labor market raises productivity growth. Furthermore, as DeLong and Summers (2012) point out, high unemployment leads to "decay" in workers skills, reducing productivity.
The final term in the productivity growth equation captures the effect of new capital. Even though the capital-output ratio is modeled as a constant, we assume that the dissemination of technical progress as well as learning-by-doing effects are embodied in the new capital stock along the lines described by Kaldor (1978 , also see Palley, 1996 Setterfield, 1997; McCombie, 2002; Hein, 2014, page 315; and Bassi and Lang, 2016 Palley (1996, page 124) writes "[t]echnical progress is therefore both 'revealed' and 'realized' through investment, so that investment serves simultaneously as the means of (1) expanding the capital stock,
(2) feeding technical innovations into the production process, and (3) uncovering further possibilities for innovation" (also see Palley, 1997) . This specification introduces a version of Verdoorn's Law into our model (a positive relation between output growth and productivity growth). Both net and replacement investment add capital with a newer vintage that embodies improved technology, becoming productive with a one-period lag. As DeLong and Summers (2012) and Summers (2014) argue, a decline in the investment share leads to slower growth in productivity.
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These effects correspond to the concept of dynamic increasing returns in production and how they relate to the size of markets (related to the expansion of demand) summarized early on by Young (1928): unit costs decline by "finding an outlet for a potential product" (page 537) and "change becomes progressive and propagates itself in a cumulative way" (page 533). Young even attributes "the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century" in large part "to the enlargement of markets"
(page 536) and not only exogenous technological innovation. 17 An anonymous referee points out that equation 6 effectively adds a second lag to the model's dynamics because
We model the growth rate of aggregate supply (potential output) as the sum of labor supply growth and productivity growth. This approach ignores, for simplicity, the compound term ( * ).
But this term is trivial for reasonable values of the growth rates.
Demand-Led Growth of Supply in Steady State
The specifications for supply growth in equations 5 and 6 cause aggregate supply to adapt to the state of demand. Because both the unemployment rate and the gross investment rate depend on the state of the economy, and because the state of the economy depends on the level of aggregate demand, demand leads supply. In this section we present the implications of this demand-supply interaction for the steady-state growth path.
The growth of aggregate supply from equations 5 and 6 is:
On a steady-state path, growth equals the rate of growth of autonomous demand * . In steady state, firms will invest so that the capital-output ratio remains at its target * . Therefore, in any steady state, −1 = * . If the growth rate of aggregate supply is in steady state and equals the growth rate of aggregate demand, then the unemployment rate must be constant. Solving the equation above for the unemployment rate that yields a constant rate of supply growth yields:
Is supply growth with the unemployment rate at * the same as steady-state demand growth? The answer is yes. At any point in time: 
Demand growth can lead supply growth, but only within limits.
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Equations 7 and 8 provide insights into how our model can address the classic "reconciliation problem" posed first by Harrod (1939; also see Setterfield, 2003; Sawyer, 2012; and Allain, 2017) in which the steady-state growth rate of supply (Harrod's "natural rate") need not equal the steady-state growth rate of demand (the "warranted rate"). If * <̂ then the steady-state growth rates of supply and demand can be reconciled by the adjustment of the unemployment rate to * . From equation 7 a necessary condition for * to exist is for the growth rate of aggregate supply to depend positively on the rate of unemployment ( 1 + 1 > 0). There must be a structural channel that allows supply to adapt to demand. Note that there is no similar necessary condition for 2 , the parameter that connects labor productivity to capital replacement. The size of 2 affects * and ̂ (see equations 7 and 8), but a positive 2 is not necessary to reconcile steady-state supply and demand growth.
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This approach to reconciliation resembles, in part, the classic approach of Robinson (1956, chapter 5 and 1962) . On the one hand, Robinson argued that economies usually operate with unemployment and therefore do not face constraints from labor supply. On the other hand, she recognizes that the equilibrium "desired" growth rate driven by the demand effects of investment and profits may be high relative to labor force growth but that situation would "call forth the innovations that it needs" (1962, page 52). 20 In our model, high demand growth "calls forth" supply growth, as long as demand growth is less than the maximum feasible level given by equation 8.
The model also shows that the steady-state demand effects of changes in saving discussed earlier will also impact steady-state supply. An increase in saving does not change steady-state growth rates or unemployment rates. But it would induce a transitory increase in unemployment that reduces supply. If the system is dynamically stable, the level of supply will converge to the lower demand path, as determined by equation 4. In general, persistent effects of demand on output and supply are basic predictions of this model. 
Empirical Calibration and Dynamic Stability
What conditions are necessary for the steady-state results described in the previous section to attract the actual dynamics of the system? Because of non-linearities and the rather large number of parameters in the model, detailed analytical results are difficult to obtain. Simulations show the 19 Dutt (2006) presents a model that reconciles demand-led growth with labor supply growth, allowing for endogenous technical change. The key adjustment mechanisms are similar to those in the neoclassical synthesis, but in the Kaleckian growth model these structures produce a continuum of possible growth equilibria. Also see Tavani and Zamparelli (2017a) .
20 Also see Harris (1978, pages 186-192) . 21 In an innovative empirical study, Girardi et al. (2017) find convincing evidence that demand changes have highly persistent effects on output, capital, and labor productivity.
demand dynamics are cyclical out of steady state with cycles that may be stable or unstable, as in Allain (2015 Allain ( , 2017 and autonomous demand growth is shocked from 2.5 to 3.0 percent. In less than 0.2 percent of the observations, including along paths that will ultimately become unstable asymptotically, does the unemployment rate fall below 2 percent in the first 10 years following the shock. The share of observations with unemployment below 2 percent is just 4 percent even if we extend the horizon to 30 years. The effect of parameters on stability is intuitive. Changes in parameters that make induced demand less sensitive to the state of the economy make the model more stable (a decrease in * or and an increase in ). More persistence in expectation formation (higher value of ) and capital adjustment (lower value of ) also stabilize the dynamics.
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The supply parameters ( , ) have little effect on dynamic stability with the structure of this model. Not surprisingly, supply lags demand since demand is the engine of output growth. Higher values of the supply parameters reduce the time it takes for supply to catch up with demand in either direction.
To build further intuition, consider figure 1 that graphs the rate of growth ( ) against the ratio of autonomous demand to output ( ). The downward sloping line plots the rate of growth such that expected growth is realized as a function of (see equation 3):
26 Cesaratto et al. (2003, footnote 19 ) also model expectations adaptively and identify the speed of adjustment of expectations as central to the dynamic stability of a similar model. An anonymous referee notes it may be unrealistic to allow current expected growth to be influenced by an arbitrarily long lag of past growth rates. We explored the effects of an alternative expectation model with weights on 10 years of lagged growth, declining geometrically and normalized to sum to one. Results were very similar. For example, the value of that induces instability rises to just 0.65, from 0.64 in our benchmark model.
Steady state occurs at the intersection of the downward sloping line and the prevailing * . Let the growth of autonomous demand rise from 0 * to 1 * with a parameter set that induces stable dynamics.
Steady state shifts to the northwest in the diagram, but the actual trajectory of the model moves to the northeast initially because faster demand growth raises actual and therefore expected growth, while output growth below the new higher rate of growth of autonomous demand initially raises the ratio.
Growth continues to accelerate and continues to rise until actual growth reaches the new level of autonomous demand growth 1 * . When the model trajectory crosses 1 * , immediately begins to fall (because now output growth exceeds autonomous demand growth). Growth continues to have positive momentum due to adaptive expectations, but for a stable parameter configuration the effect of the falling value of eventually offsets the unstable expectation dynamics (see equation 2) causing output growth to peak and then decline . When the falling growth rate crosses 1 * ,at the left extreme value of the cycle, the direction of reverses, eventually causing actual growth to rise again. Subsequent cycles rotate in ever smaller orbits as the system converges to the new steady state.
Figure 1 Stable Cyclical Dynamics of and
Now consider what happens if growth expectations are more sensitive to changes in output growth (a reduced value of ). Then growth rises more quickly after a positive shock to autonomous demand growth. The falling value of when growth exceeds 1 * ,can still reverse the growth cycle, but 0 * = 2.5% 1 * = 3.0%
perhaps not until the cycle trajectory moves so far to the left in the figure that the cycle becomes unstable (figure 2). A faster adjustment speed of the capital-output ratio ( ) has a similar effect. An increase in s shifts the negatively sloped line in the figure to the right meaning that the entire cycle trajectory has a higher value of . This change is stabilizing because it raises the share of autonomous demand relative to the induced demand and makes it more likely that the stabilizing anchor of autonomous demand can overcome the destabilizing dynamics of expectations and the acceleratormultiplier process. A reduction in v* rotates the downward sloping line counter-clockwise, again raising and stabilizing the system, other things equal. Furthermore, from equation 7, a positive shock to labor productivity will raise unemployment. The reason is straightforward: demand does not automatically adjust to supply in this model and a more productive economy requires less labor to satisfy given demand.
This result seems to support the common "populist" (perhaps even "Luddite") claim that laborsaving innovation destroys jobs. But the result also suggests the solution to the problem: raise aggregate demand. In one sense, this perspective is similar to the mainstream New Keynesian view that monetary policy provides the key mechanism to reconcile aggregate demand to aggregate supply.
Therefore a positive technology shock would justify expansionary monetary policy to boost demand.
But our dynamic perspective with endogenous supply pushes the argument further. If labor productivity growth rises above autonomous demand growth the resulting gap between actual and maximum feasible output will grow with time. It is far from clear that interest rate adjustment or even unconventional monetary policy ("quantitative easing" for example) will be adequate to fill the gap. A one-time adjustment is not sufficient; monetary policy would need to be continuously eased. In addition, since supply adapts to demand, a failure of monetary policy to raise demand growth after a positive productivity shock will compromise the supply side. The economy may appear to converge to something like "potential output," but the level of potential itself is lower that it could have been with faster demand growth.
###It is also important to consider whether there is a "natural" rate of unemployment or a "natural" rate of growth in this model. Autonomous demand growth can be affected by a variety of private behaviors and policy regimes. In the U.S., we interpret spending growth generated by the recent housing or technology bubbles as shifts in the dynamics of autonomous demand. Furthermore, the end of bubble-supported demand will reduce autonomous demand. In both Europe and the U.S., the "pivot to austerity" for fiscal policy in the aftermath of the financial crisis affects the path of autonomous demand. If something like the supply-side mechanisms from our model operate in real-world economies, supply growth will adapt to changes in the dynamics of autonomous demand. There is no "natural" rate of growth of the supply side independent of demand dynamics.
The results here also show that a potentially wide range of unemployment rates is consistent with aggregate demand leading aggregate supply. One might associate a target rate of unemployment with the minimum unemployment rate and maximum rate of autonomous demand growth defined earlier (̂ and ̂). But it will be difficult to know what these rates are in practice. Because supply adapts to demand, the economy might follow a lower growth path than feasible but without clear signals of excess supply. Furthermore, while the unemployment rate in steady state indicates the degree to which growth is lower than what could be feasible, the actual economy will operate on a cyclical path outside of steady state and the unemployment rate could be a misleading indicator for years about the extent to which the economy falls short of its possible growth path.
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This model seems particularly relevant to the recent incarnation of what Summers (2014) labeled "secular stagnation." 28 The engine of growth is autonomous demand. A significant drop in autonomous demand growth will drag medium-run actual growth along with it. Consider the dynamics of U.S. household demand and its relation to housing finance. In the decades leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, rising household debt ratios signaled that a substantial portion of U.S.
household demand was financed not by rising incomes but by borrowing. Part of this kind of spending can be interpreted as autonomous in the context of our model, that is, demand driven by factors other than the growth of incomes (although some of the borrowing and spending may have been induced by income growth). When the crisis hit, a significant source of autonomous demand growth was lost and 27 Skott (2005) presents a model with endogenous wage-setting norms in which demand affects equilibrium unemployment and there is no "structurally determined natural rate of unemployment."
28 Summers took this term from Alvin Hansen although related ideas are widely discussed in heterodox research during the intervening period, for example Robinson (1956 Robinson ( , 1962 and Steindl (1972) .
not replaced by faster autonomous growth of any other demand component. The result has been persistent stagnation of output growth and a convergence of the supply side to a weaker demand path.
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This approach also has implications for fiscal policy. Government spending is a significant source of demand, and much government spending should be classified as autonomous. 30 Government transfer payments for retirement income and health care also likely support a large and growing amount of autonomous demand. With so much autonomous demand coming from fiscal policy, our model implies that acceptable aggregate growth simply may not be feasible under fiscal austerity. A reduction in the rate of autonomous demand growth induced by fiscal austerity will always lead to a lower growth path for both demand and supply in our model.
While our model generates demand-led growth, labor supply can impose constraints on the extent to which supply can accommodate demand. 31 This outcome is obvious from equation 8 that derives the maximum steady-state demand growth rate consistent with the lower bound on the unemployment rate. But the constraints imposed by supply are more nuanced than the simple ceiling on production that we imposed in Fazzari, et al. (2013) . The model developed here proposes that there is an empirically relevant range of growth rates of demand that induce supply growth to adapt to demand growth, reversing the direction of causation of mainstream macro growth theory.
Finally, because there is no explicit role for income distribution, our model sidesteps a key issue. But some changes in the specification of saving and consumption could extend the findings to connect distribution and growth. Suppose the saving rate depends on income distribution along 29 Consider the continuous reduction in the Congressional Budget Office forecasts for U.S. potential output following the Great Recession. The actual level of output in 2017 that was approximately equal to 2017 estimates of potential output would have generated an output gap of over 10 percent based on the decade-ahead potential output forecast from 2007.
30 Government spending also includes "automatic stabilizers" that respond to the state of the economy. These structures could be an important stabilizer, which we intend to explore in further research.
standard lines, with a higher wage share reducing s. Holding autonomous demand growth constant this change will not affect steady-state growth. But as argued by Lavoie (2016) and Dutt (2019) , a rise in the wage share will shift the level of the steady-state path upward (see equation 4) and therefore increase the average growth rate as the system converges toward a new steady state. This result is, in a broad sense, consistent with the short-run concept of wage-led growth pioneered by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) .
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The structure of our investment function, which does not have an independent effect of the profit share or profit rate on investment, excludes by assumption the possibility of profit-led growth described by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) . That said, a different kind of extension could add some aspects of Bhaduri-Marglin profit-led growth. Suppose the source of autonomous demand is capitalist consumption. Dutt (2019) proposes such a specification with the growth of capitalist consumption given exogenously. Extend this approach, however, to posit a behavioral relationship between the growth of autonomous capitalist consumption and the level of the profit share. Then a shift in distribution towards profits would raise steady-state growth. Moreover, this capitalist consumption behavior would be validated as actual growth of both demand and supply would rise in steady state supporting a faster increase in profit income (assuming unemployment is above its minimum level ̂, see equation 8).
Conclusion
The first message of this paper is that demand can be the engine of economic growth. Of course what is demanded must be feasible to produce, that is, adequate supply is necessary to realize a demand-led growth path. This paper's primary result is that endogenous linkages between the demand-determined state of the economy and both labor supply and labor productivity provide channels through which supply accommodates growth driven by demand. This approach reconciles Harrod's warranted and natural rates of growth. The model shows how the demand and supply sides interact with each playing a substantive role in macroeconomic growth determinants over the medium run (also see Mason, 2017) . Our results differ from the mainstream perspective that relegates demand to a short run of a few quarters with supply alone determining growth over multi-year horizons.
Demand growth in our model cannot generate arbitrarily high rates of actual economic growth because of limits on labor supply. We believe that this feature is an important and empirically relevant implication of our model, not often recognized in Keynesian growth models. While one can debate whether developed economies can feasibly grow at 2, 3, or 4 percent for a sustained period of time, it seems unreasonable to propose that mature economies could grow at 10 percent or more for an extended period without running hard into supply constraints. 33 That said, a simple empirical calibration of our model shows it is entirely reasonable that acceleration of demand growth from something like 2 to 3 percent could be accommodated by supply. Perhaps more important, misguided attempts at demand-side "austerity" will drag supply down with them. "Output gaps" may seem to disappear as supply adjusts to weak demand growth but nonetheless the economy stagnates relative to what would be feasible with more robust demand.
The results here are consistent with the idea of hysteresis, or "history matters," in the sense that the dynamic path of demand fundamentally affects the economy's productive potential (as in Setterfield, 1997; DeLong and Summers, 2012; Mason, 2017 ; among many others). Although analytical results often focus on steady states with constant growth rates of autonomous demand, the actual path of autonomous spending in real economies likely evolves over time. For example, there is 33 Skott, (2016, p. 15) writes the "supply side matters, and there is nothing particularly Keynesian about an exclusive focus on the demand side." Dosi et al. (2010) explore the complementarities between Keynesian demand dynamics and Schumpeterian technical change on the supply side.
little doubt that the institutional changes in US household credit access in the 1970s and 1980s affected the path of autonomous household demand for the decades leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. This example illustrates the more general point that "autonomous" need not mean "exogenous" or "constant." Rather autonomous demand refers to spending that is not induced by the state of the economy. To apply the message of our model empirically is to explore how autonomous demand evolves in particular historical periods. 34 In this sense, our approach relates to the rich historical analysis of demand generation and its effects on aggregate growth in earlier heterodox growth research such as Steindl (1976) .
In addition to empirical analysis of the dynamics of autonomous demand, further work is needed on the key structural parameters that link the demand and supply sides of the system. The calibration presented earlier is empirically based, but research needs to better pin down the relationship between the state of the economy, labor supply, and labor productivity (see Storm, 2017) . These parameters are the key determinants of the range of demand-led growth paths that can be accommodated by supply.
The results have critical implications for policy. Most obviously, policy objectives must focus on demand well beyond the mainstream "short run." When private autonomous demand falters public demand can help avoid stagnation. Furthermore, there is the danger of what Palley (2017) describes as policy "lock in," demand-side austerity policy can limit supply growth and cause the appearance of a small traditionally defined output gap even though more aggressive demand growth policies could pull supply upward to generate better medium-term outcomes. As Mason (2017, p. 10) writes "a belief that hysteresis just reflects the 'new normal' can be self confirming." Cornwall and Cornwall (1994, page 238) write that their paper "can be seen as outlining a research strategy for investigators who might wish to put some numbers on programmes designed to better utilize available resources and to reduce unemployment." Our paper is also step in this direction.
We show that demand-led reductions in unemployment and greater resource utilization can be accommodated by the economy's supply side within limits. Original empirical work shows that expanding autonomous demand can be a stable anchor for an actual path of demand-led growth and empirically relevant changes in demand growth can be accommodated by supply, inverting the logical sense of the old Say's Law argument. 
Empirical Appendix and Parameter Calibration for Simulations

Estimates of Sensitivity of Consumption Spending to Changes in Aggregate Output
(Parameter 1 -s)
This parameter measures the magnitude of induced consumption, that is, consumption spending that varies with the state of the economy.
We estimate this parameter in several ways. First, we perform a simple regression of real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) on real GDP.
This regression directly estimates the basic specification for the consumption in the model.
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Because GDP and consumption are almost certainly cointegrated, an OLS regression should provide a consistent estimate of the key parameter. To examine further robustness, however, we also estimate "dynamic OLS" (DOLS) models that will be asymptotically consistent under a broader range of assumptions. Because our theoretical model is recursive, consumption in t depends on expectations formed based on earlier information. Therefore, we also estimated a two-stage least squares model with current output instrumented by two lags of output. The results were almost identical to those reported above.
We also considered adding more structure to the empirical model by linking consumption to disposable personal income (DPI, that is, income net of taxes) and then regressing DPI on GDP. In this case, the parameter 1 -s in the theoretical model would be proxied by the product of the two regression coefficients. The OLS results are:
Model It is not surprising that consumption is more sensitive to disposable income than it is to total output. But when one considers the effect of total output on disposable income the estimate for 1 -s is virtually identical with the estimates from the the first table above.
While PCE is the standard measure of consumption, it is in some ways misleading for our purposes.
As discussed in detail in Cynamon and Fazzari (2017) , PCE includes significant parts of consumption that likely should be considered autonomous, most obviously government-financed health care. The standard PCE measure also includes significant imputed components that are not cash expenditures on final output by the household sector, most obviously imputed rent on owner-occupied housing. Using updated data through 2016 following the methods described in Cynamon and Fazzari (2017) provides time-series data on household demand (HH_DEM), a measure more consistent with the consumption concept used in the theoretical model. The adjustments to remove items from PCE that are not cash expenditures of the household sector also imply the need to adjust DPI. For example, if government-financed health expenditure is not considered part of household demand then these payments should not be included in household disposable income (as they are in the standard definition of DPI).
We revised the data on disposable income to estimate actual cash income of the US household sector (again based on Cynamon and Fazzari, 2017) and then re-estimated the DPI regressions:
Model What the substantially lower estimate of 1 -s with HH_DEM implies is that if one adjusts consumption and income measures to remove government-financed consumption (which is substantial) and other imputations, a greater share of GDP is autonomous. This makes sense. Government spending on health care (as well as smaller categories like unemployment insurance) will not likely vary with income (indeed they are likely counter-cyclical).
This analysis leads us to a benchmark estimate for 1 -s more closely tied to the adjusted household demand approach, that is, about 0.5. Nonetheless, in the parameter range considered in the paper we allow for values derived from standard measures of PCE and set the range for 1 -s between 0.40 to 0.80.
Estimates of the Capital-Output Ratio and Capital Dynamics
(Parameters v* and )
The measurement of capital is far from straightforward owing to the problems of aggregating heterogeneous capital goods based on value measures. That said, for our purposes the issue is not about measuring the value of a "factor of production." Rather, our model requires the long-run capital-output ratio parameter (v*) to quantify how investment depends on expected output growth.
For this reason, it is most useful to calibrate v* using investment data. In steady state, the investment share of output is given by the simple expression:
The aggregate investment share in the US (I/Y) had a positive secular trend in the postwar decades that ended with the early 1980s recession. Since the early 1980s the investment share has been highly cyclical but it has little long-term trend. There was quite a large peak in the late 1990s associated with the "technology bubble," however. We also set the benchmark depreciation rate ( ) at 8.4%. This parameter has been quite stable in the data and has little effect on dynamic results, so we do not consider a range for .
It is noteworthy that if one calculates v* from BEA non-residential capital stock data (value aggregates), again averaged over 2002 to 2016, the estimate is just slightly higher: 1.22.
Furthermore, we can estimate the dynamics of the capital-output ratio from the BEA capital stock data. The actual capital-output ratio in any year is a good proxy for the "target" ratio (̂) in our model. Using the actual value of the capital-output ratio in place of the target gives the simple auto-regression equation
We used data from 1985 through 2016 to estimate this equation, a period in which is largely without trend. The implied value for is 0.087 with a standard error of 0.055. The value implies substantial persistence in the capital-output ratio, which stabilizes the dynamics of our model. The regression constant can also be used to solve for an independent estimate of * which is 1.18, again consistent with the results discussed above.
From these estimates we set the benchmark value for * at 1.2, with a range from 1.00 to 1.50 and the benchmark value for at 0.09 with a range from 0.05 to 0.20. (Parameter ) In the model, growth expectations drive both consumption and investment. Expectations adapt in the direction of actual growth according to the equation:
Dynamics of Growth Expectations
To calibrate , we employ data from the survey of professional forecasters on one-year ahead real GDP growth (available from 1992 through 2017) to measure expected growth. Actual growth is annualized real GDP growth. A regression that constrains the coefficients on lagged actual growth and lagged expected growth to sum to one implies extreme persistence with an estimate of equal to 0.989 (standard error of 0.017). With lagged actual growth and lagged expected growth unconstrained in the regression the estimate is 0.759 (standard error of 0.065) with the coefficient on lagged actual growth of 0.018 (standard error of 0.016).
These results imply persistent expectations. We set the benchmark value of to 0.90 and the range from 0.75 to 0.95.
Labor Force Growth and the Unemployment Rate
One of the key parameters that causes the convergence of the growth of supply to the growth of demand is 1 , the effect of the unemployment rate on the growth rate of labor supply: Results are similar using the dynamic least squares approach described earlier, although standard errors are somewhat higher. The rise in the size of the coefficient with a more recent sample may be the result of removing years when substantial labor force growth was driven by the large increase in female labor force participation.
From these results, we choose a benchmark value for 1 of 0.20 with a range from 0.10 to 0.30.
Labor Productivity Growth
(Parameters 1 and 2 )
To calibrate the productivity growth equation:
we need to estimate the effect of the unemployment level on productivity growth and the effect of capital replacement ( −1 + ). Because of the difficulty of measuring the capital stock, we use the growth of output to proxy the growth of capital; in the long-run, the two measures should converge. We estimated the parameters with dynamic least squares (with two leads and lags) as described above. The In the regressions with the two effects estimated separately the coefficients are significant (especially for 1 ) and economically large. Combining the two effects in a single regression with rather limited data the estimates are imprecise, but the point estimates are largely consistent with the separate regression results. (Note that the leads and lags in the DOLS regressions add five independent variables for each effect estimated. Therefore lack of precision in the combined regression is not surprising.) 37 Furthermore, the results for the growth effect are consistent with other estimates in the literature. The preferred "demand-side" estimate of the Verdoorn coefficient (equivalent to 2 here) relating productivity growth to output growth in Angeriz, et al. (2008) is 0.67. Values greater than 0.5 are regularly cited. Michl (1985, table 2) finds Verdoorn coefficients estimated from international panel data that vary from 0.49 to 0.68 for manufacturing industries. Hein (2014, table 8.2, pp. 327-8) surveys a wide range of empirical estimates. While the estimate can be as low as 0.11, the vast majority of estimates for many countries fall between 0.3 and 0.6.
Based on this information, we set the benchmark value of 1 and 2 to 0.5 with ranges from 0.3 to 0.7. The possibility that 1 in particular may be somewhat higher than the upper end of this range would only magnify the results discussed in the text.
A summary of the empirically based benchmark parameter values and their relevant range appears in table 1 in the text.
Simulations use the benchmark parameter values except as noted in the text. All simulations are calibrated with initial values to be in steady state as follows:
• Initial growth rate of autonomous demand (g*): 2.5%
• Initial unemployment rate (u): 4.0%
• The intercept of the labor force growth equation ( 0 ) is set to generate initial labor force growth of 0.5%
• The intercept of the productivity growth equation ( 0 ) is set to generate initial productivity growth of 0.5%
Note that with initial labor force growth of 0.5% and productivity growth of 2.0%, initial aggregate supply growth matches the steady-state rate of demand growth.
Simulations to explore stability begin in steady-state and the model is then shocked with a permanent increase in the autonomous demand growth rate from 2.5% to 3.0%, except as described in the text.
Appendix: Dynamic Stability in the Linearized Model
The squared term in the investment function as well as the presence of endogenous variables in the denominators of ratios introduce nonlinearities in our model. General statements about dynamic stability are difficult to obtain in nonlinear discrete-time models. Results from a linearized version of the model can be informative, however. If the eigenvalues of the linearized model are less than one in modulus, a region exists around the model's steady state such that, if the steady state is disturbed within that region, the dynamics will converge back to the steady state. The size of the stability region for our model does not have an analytically tractable representation. That said, simulations of our model show that the eigenvalue condition for stability in the linearized model correspond very closely to results for the full nonlinear model, as discussed below.
We derive the linearized model in two steps. First we present the linearized equations for the demand side of the model. We then add the supply-side equations and prove that if the linearized demand model is stable, the full model will be stable with supply converging to the demand-led growth path.
Demand-Side Model
Specify the demand-side model with a vector of five endogenous variables: the actual growth rate ( ), expected growth rate ( ), target capital-output ratio (̂), actual capital-output ratio ( ), and the ratio of autonomous demand to output ( ).
To simplify notation let denote 1 + and denote 1 + . As described in the paper the model has a unique (non-degenerate) steady state. Steady-state conditions for the key variables are as follows (with steady-state values denoted by an asterisk):
Capital-output ratio: =̂= * Ratio of autonomous demand to output: = * Unemployment rate: = *
All parameters in the model are non-negative. Economic logic would likely restrict all parameters to be less than one with the exception of the various v parameters (capital-output ratio). In principle, v could take on any positive value, but the sensible empirical range is likely from 0.5 to 3. We obtain partial derivatives of with respect to all endogenous variables with total differentiation as follows:
The relevant partial derivatives in the neighborhood of steady-state are: Demand-side system in recursive form:
The full system can be written in matrix form as follows: or ⃗ = ⃗ −1 + ⃗ . The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix − determine the local stability of the model's demand side. Analytical solutions for these eigenvalues are difficult to derive and largely impossible to interpret economically. As mentioned above, however, simulations confirm that if the modulus of the maximum eigenvalue of − is less than one then the model is stable unless the modulus of the maximum eigenvalue is very close to unity or the shock is very large. More specific information appears below after the supply side is added.
Supply Side
The growth of supply is specified as a linear function (labor supply growth plus productivity growth). But nonlinearities are induced by including the growth of the capital stock ( ) and the unemployment rate ( ) in the specification of supply growth. are the eigenvalues of the demand side of the system which, as described above, are a complicated function of demand-side parameters. But the eigenvalues of the simple matrix are two zeroes and the diagonal element 1 − ( 1 + 1 )(1 − * )/ * . This additional eigenvalue introduced by the supply side is always less than one. It will exceed -1 except in the very unlikely case that 1 + 1 > 2, which would imply implausibly large effects of the unemployment rate on labor force and/or productivity growth.
These observations prove that if the modulus of the maximum eigenvalue of the linearized demand side is less than one, the modulus of the maximum eigenvalue of the full linearized system with the supply side will be less than one. Therefore, in a neighborhood around the steady state of the model, if the demand side is stable, supply will converge to demand.
Extensive simulations show that this neighborhood corresponds very closely with the behavior of the full nonlinear model. For example, with the benchmark parameter values the maximum eigenvalue of the linearized model is 0.943 and simulations of the nonlinear model are stable for shocks exceeding 20 percent of GDP. Reducing the expectation adjustment parameter ( ) from the benchmark value of 0.90 to 0.70 raises the maximum eigenvalue to 0.953 and the amplitude of the cycles rises, but the model remains stable for shocks to the growth of autonomous demand exceeding 20 percent of GDP. Modest further reductions of push the model toward instability. With = 0.68, the maximum eigenvalue becomes 0.970 and an autonomous demand shock greater than 18% of GDP induces unstable cycles. This outcome occurs even though the linearized model is stable because the shock is large enough to push the system outside the stable neighborhood of the nonlinear model. With = 0.65, the linearized model is just barely stable with a maximum eigenvalue of 0.996. In this case shocks as small as 3.1% of GDP lead to unstable dynamics.
